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  The economic implications of increased globalization have been widely conjectured and 
researched.  One prominent concern has been how foreign competition, trade protection, and 
foreign ownership affect the level and distribution of wages.1  Largely overlooked, however, has 
been the issue of whether international linkages condition how firms share profits with their 
workers. 
  A large literature has found that economic rents are often shared with workers:  profits and 
wages move together.2  With the exception of Budd and Slaughter (2000), however, this rent-
sharing literature has an explicitly domestic focus:  industry, firm, or establishment wages in a 
specific country are regressed on profit measures for operations in that same country.  Yet with 
increased globalization, this implicitly closed-economy perspective may miss important 
international aspects of wage setting. 
  Consider, for example, the United Auto Workers.  This U.S. labor union agreed to major 
concessions in the early 1980s to help save the then-U.S.-owned Chrysler.  More recently, 
however, the UAW has reportedly been unwilling to grant concessions because while the U.S. 
operation is struggling financially, its German parent Daimler-Chrysler is profitable.3  As an 
                                                 
1 Foreign ownership has been studied by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) and Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) trade protection 
by Gaston and Trefler (1995), and Haskel and Slaughter (2001); and foreign competition by Borjas and Ramey (1995), and 
Freeman and Katz (1991).  These are representative examples, as the trade-and-wages literature has grown very large.  Many 
representative studies can be found in the volumes of Abowd and Freeman (1991) and Feenstra (2000). 
2  Analyses of inter-industry wage differentials (e.g., Katz and Summers, 1989) revealed positive correlation between these 
differentials and industry profitability.  A number of subsequent studies, whether using industry wages and profits (Blanchflower, 
Oswald, and Sanfey, 1996), union contract wages with company profits (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Currie and McConnell, 
1992; Svejnar, 1986), union contract wages with industry profits (Christofides and Oswald, 1992; Budd and Slaughter, 2000), or 
company wages with company profits (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997), all find that wages depend on ability to pay. 
3 The December 18, 2000 issue of Business Week reported, “He's [Chrysler Group President Dieter Zetsche] not likely to get 
much of a hearing from UAW President Stephen P. Yokich.  After winning the richest contract terms in years in 1999, union 
members have little reason to start giving money back.  That's in part because, despite Chrysler's deepening problems--it's 
expected to lose some $1 billion in the fourth quarter--the German parent remains exceedingly profitable.”  More recently, a 
similar cross-border wage dispute has arisen in multinational steel producer Corus.  The February 12, 2002 edition of The Times 
reported, “Corus, the Anglo-Dutch steel maker, could face industrial action in a clash with unions for imposing a pay freeze in 
the U.K. while increasing salaries of Dutch workers … A spokesman for the [British] union said, ‘We all work for the same 
company, and we should all get the same deal.’”   2
example of international rent sharing as an explicit compensation strategy of multinational firms, 
in 1989 PepsiCo implemented a global employee stock ownership plan in which all employees 
worldwide were granted shares of stock equivalent to 10 percent of their pay.  Numerous other 
companies have implemented similar strategies (Irwin, 1998).  Lastly, Mexican law mandates 
cross-border profit-sharing:  Mexican employees must receive 10 percent of the worldwide 
profits of their employer, not just of the employer’s profits earned in Mexico (Meyers, 2000). 
  These examples all demonstrate how cross-border flows of capital, labor, goods, and 
information may exert strong influences on the nature of profit sharing between firms and 
workers.  Budd and Slaughter (2000) consider whether wages in one country may depend on 
profit conditions outside of that country.  Empirically, they found that union wage contracts in 
Canadian manufacturing industries depend not just on Canadian industry profits but also on U.S. 
industry profits—and also that the nature of this profit sharing depends on the nationality of the 
firm and union. 
  This paper builds on this theme of international rent sharing by examining whether profits are 
shared across borders within multinational firms.  We do this using a rich firm-level panel data 
set on multinationals with parents and affiliates operating in Europe.  This panel we assembled 
from the Amadeus Database, which reports detailed financial and operational data for both 
parents and affiliates in multinationals.4  The panel spans 1993 through 1998, with a total of 865 
parents and 1919 foreign affiliates.  With this panel we can ask whether affiliate wages vary not 
just with affiliate profits but also with parent profits, and similarly whether parent wages vary not 
just with parent profits but also with affiliate profits. 
                                                 
4 In other contexts, Budina, Garretsen, and de Jong (2000) and Konings, Van Cayseele, and Warzynski (2001) use this same data 
source.  It is available from Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing.   3
  Our main empirical finding is that parents share profits with majority-owned foreign 
affiliates.  For affiliates owned at least 50 percent by the controlling parent, foreign-affiliate 
wages are correlated with parent profits per worker.  This correlation is both statistically and 
economically significant, and appears across a range of specification and estimation choices 
addressing various measurement and endogeneity issues.  The degree of multinational ownership 
appears to condition the degree of intra-firm profit sharing, with many specifications indicating 
parents share profits only with majority-owned affiliates, and even more strongly with fully-
owned affiliates.  Our central estimates indicate that a doubling of parent profitability raises 
affiliate wages by somewhere between 1 and 5 percent.  Affiliate wages are also positively 
correlated with affiliate profits per worker, consistent with the closed-economy perspective of 
previous rent-sharing studies.  The same is true of parent wages and parent profits per worker; 
however, we find no evidence that parent wages are correlated with affiliate profits per worker. 
  For a number of reasons, we consider this explicitly international focus on profit sharing to 
be an important innovation on earlier research.  First, within the rent-sharing literature it 
broadens the understanding of how firms relate to workers.  Budd and Slaughter’s (2000) cross-
border focus was limited to unionized wage negotiations in manufacturing for a single country 
using industry-level profit measures.  Our panel extends their focus along many important 
dimensions—many parent and affiliate countries, firms in all industries, wages for all 
employees—and therefore takes a much broader look at the relevance of international profit 
sharing.  The need to examine profit sharing in an international context is underscored by rising 
foreign direct investment, which has been a central aspect of globalization in recent years.5 
                                                 
5 UNCTAD (2000) reports that from 1979 to 1999, the ratio of world FDI stock to world gross domestic product rose from 5% to 
16% and the ratio of world FDI inflows to global gross domestic capital formation rose from 2% to 14%.  One consequence is 
that an increasing share of country’s output is accounted for by foreign affiliates of multinational firms.  The foreign-affiliate 
share of world production is now 15% in manufacturing and other tradables (Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter, 1998).   4
  Second, our paper extends the research on globalization and labor markets.  Many studies 
have found that establishments owned by multinational firms pay higher wages than do 
domestically owned establishments, even controlling for a wide range of worker and/or plant 
characteristics such as worker occupation and plant capital intensity.6  This “multinational” wage 
premium is sometimes seen to be a puzzle.  But if multinationals are, on average, more profitable 
than domestic firms, then international rent sharing with multinationals could explain this wage 
premium.  Within the globalization-and-wages literature, other studies have examined whether 
multinationals alter the mix of activities within parent and host countries.7  One point of contrast 
is that much of the empirical work in this literature has followed from the perfectly competitive 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model in which all sectors earn zero profits and all workers earn their 
marginal revenue products.  Our focus on profit sharing extends this literature to consider 
important non-competitive wage issues.8 
  Finally, our findings on international rent sharing carry implications for the international-
macro literature on cross-country movements in macro aggregates.  In international macro and 
real business cycle models, the standard mechanism by which national income shocks are 
transmitted and smoothed across countries is by trading risk in international capital markets (e.g., 
Stockman and Tesar, 1995). However, many researchers have documented that the extent of 
international asset diversification is less than the standard models predict (Lewis, 1999; Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2000). Our finding of international rent sharing in multinational firms provides a 
                                                 
6 For example, Howenstine and Zeile (1994) and Doms and Jensen (1998) document these wage differentials among U.S. 
manufacturing plants. Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994) present similar evidence for Canada; Aitken et al. (1996) for 
Mexico and Venezuela. 
7 Examples here include Konings and Murphy (2001) and Slaughter (2000). 
8 Our non-competitive approach is closer to studies such as Borjas and Ramey (1995), who investigate whether import 
competition squeezes rents paid to U.S. less-skilled workers in imperfectly competitive industries, and Gaston and Trefler (1995), 
who examine the effect of U.S. tariffs on industry wage premia.   5
micro-level linkage, very different from risk sharing in international financial markets, which is 
an implicit risk-sharing mechanism that can also transmit economic conditions across countries. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 motivates the empirical analysis with a 
discussion of the underlying theory of profit sharing, with an extension to the multinational 
context.  It then discusses our empirical framework.  Section 3 presents a description of the data 
and Section 4 the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Theoretical Background and Empirical Framework 
Theoretical Background 
  Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975) developed implicit-contract models in which wages 
provide insurance against demand shocks for risk-averse workers (see Rosen, 1985 for a survey).  
Blanchflower et al. (1996) showed that if these models are generalized to allow firms to be risk 
averse, then wages will be positively correlated with profits.  We extend this idea to 
multinational firms that, by definition, operate in multiple countries. 
  Consider a multinational firm that operates in a parent country p and an affiliate country a.  
Without loss of generality, assume that demand shocks τ have a distribution function g(τ) that 










where w denotes the wage, n is employment, f(·) is the production function, and superscripts 
indicate parent or affiliate. The firm maximizes over wages and employment utility function v(·): 
  (1)       ∫ ∂τ τ π ) ( ) ( maximize g v  
subject to satisfying the minimum-utility constraints of its employees: 
  (2)    
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where u(·) is the workers’ utility function, b is some exogenous alternative (such as an 
unemployment benefit), and u is a minimum utility level. 
  To see cross-border profit sharing within this multinational firm, consider affiliate wages.  
The first-order condition derived from differentiating equation (1) with respect to w
a is: 
  (4)     0 ) ( ) ( = ′ + + ′ −
a a a p w u v λ π π  
where λ
a is the Lagrange multiplier for equation (3) in the constrained maximization problem. 
Ignoring corner solutions, equation (4) implies that λ
a > 0 and defines an implicit wage function 
for the affiliate wage.9 
  Differentiating (4) with respect to π
p yields: 


















If the firm is risk neutral, then this derivative equals zero and wages do not respond to firm 
profitability.  But if both firms and workers are risk averse, then both v(·) and u(·) are concave 
and the derivative in equation (5) is positive: affiliate wages respond to parent profits as a form 
of risk sharing.10  By similar logic, it can be shown that parent wages can vary with affiliate 
profitability.  Thus, within multinational firms cross-border rent sharing can stem from implicit 
contracts between risk-averse firms and workers.11 
                                                 
9 In this simple form, the model does not prevent a corner solution in which the firm chooses to conduct all of its production in 
the country with the lower minimum utility level.  We believe it is reasonable to consider the interior-solution cases with 
production in both countries.  These cases can result from plausible reasons including sunk fixed capital investment in each 
country, a desire to maintain entry to multiple markets, or access to materials and other primary factors.  These cases also accord 
with the data set for our empirical analysis. 
10 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) support the plausibility of risk averse firms; see also Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983).  Examples 
of models with risk averse firms include Hart (1983) for implicit contracts and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) for multinational 
production decisions. 
11 This result, of course, depends on the firm’s utility function v(π
p, π
a) being a non-separable function of both π
p and π
a.  If the 
firm is risk averse but v(π
p, π
a) is separable, then the model predicts domestic but not international rent sharing.  Also, the   7
  Profit sharing is also predicted by other models.  One is union bargaining over the firm’s 
economic rents.  Bargaining over parent as well as affiliate profits by unions representing 
affiliate employees is a straightforward extension in a Nash bargaining framework (Budd and 
Slaughter, 2000).  Alternatively, employee bargaining power need not stem from unionization:  
in Lindbeck and Snower’s (1988) insider-outsider model, current employees (insiders) derive the 
power to extract economic rents from the employer via their ability to not cooperate with new 
employees if they are hired at a lower wage.  This framework can yield international rent sharing 
if insiders at an affiliate use their power to extract parent as well as affiliate profits.  Finally, 
international rent sharing can also result from models of fairness in which not sharing parent 
profits is perceived to be somehow unjust, or from models of corporate strategy in which 
multinationals share parent profits with affiliate workers to generate positive goodwill, or even 
prevent government seizure, in the affiliate country. 
Empirical Framework 
  Equation (5), or similar predictions from these other models, suggests the following 
regression equation for empirical analysis using panel data on affiliate wages: 
(6)  
pt at





=β +β +β +ε  
where subscripts a, p, and t index affiliates, parents, and time t; w is wages; π is profits; n is 
employment; Z is a set of other regressors that vary by affiliate and/or time; ε is an error term we 
discuss below; and βs are parameters to be estimated.  Our innovation is to consider the role of 
profitability outside the country where wages are paid; that is, we are interested in estimating not 
                                                                                                                                                             
assumption that the demand shock τ equally affects domestic and foreign production is simply to keep the model straightforward.  
The key prediction of interest in equation (5) stems from v(π
p, π
a), not the functional form of τ.   8
just β1 but in particular β2 as well.  Equation (6) forms the basis of our empirical analysis, with 
an analogous equation for parent wages.  We next address some important specification, 
measurement, and endogeneity issues. 
  Important specification issues include how to indicate profitability and what controls to 
include in the Zat regressor.  It is standard in the rent-sharing literature to normalize profitability 
in per-worker terms, a method which we follow here.  In Z we include a full set of unobservable 
affiliate fixed effects, αa.  These account for unobserved time-invariant affiliate heterogeneity 
that influences wages:  worker quality, firm technology, or outside wage options.  We also 
include a full set of time effects, ηt.  These account for unobserved heterogeneity over time 
common to all affiliates, such as skill-biased technological change.  Finally, in Zat we also 
include affiliate-time varying measures of capital stock per worker and R&D expenditures per 
worker, as well as country-year fixed effects.  The former are directly observed wage controls, 
while the latter account for national influences such as unemployment rates and benefits.  Our 
baseline estimates will be for equation (6) using a standard fixed-effects estimator. 
  There may be issues of endogeneity and measurement that stem from the use of 
contemporaneous profits in equation (6).  If wage outcomes affect profitability, then the use of 
current-period wages and profits can bias estimates in the fixed-effects regression.  In terms of 
measurement, as discussed below, wages and profits are constructed using some of the same 
quantities such as total wage bill and employment.  Measurement error in these quantities can 
introduce spurious correlation between the dependent and independent variables in equation (6). 
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First-differencing controls for affiliate fixed effects αa, and if there is no serial correlation then 
lagged profits are not correlated with the differenced error term and are therefore valid 
instruments for current profits.  Lack of serial correlation provides a moment restriction, so that 
equation (7) can be estimated using generalized method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). Relative to conventional instrumental variables estimators, this moment restriction 
provides additional instruments so this GMM estimator is more efficient (Arellano and Bond, 
1991).  For example, for 1998 profits in equation (7), valid instruments are the level of profits in 
1996 and earlier years, since lagged profit levels are not correlated with the differenced error 
term between 1997 and 1998.  As the panel progresses an increasing number of instruments can 
be used, which increases the efficiency of the estimates. 
  To test the validity of these instruments we use a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, 
which asymptotically has a
2 χ distribution.  Because the model is estimated in first differences, 
the equation will be characterized by the presence of first-order serial correlation.  But the 
validity of the GMM estimator relies on the moment restriction stemming from the absence of 
second-order serial correlation.  It is therefore important to test for second-order serial 
correlation, and we report Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test which asymptotically has a N(0,1) 
distribution.  Since the model is estimated in first differences and since lagged values (dated at 
least t-2 and before) of the endogenous variables are used, we need to observe affiliates for at 
least 3 consecutive time periods.  In the empirical results, then, our sample sizes are smaller 
when we estimate equation (7) via GMM than when we estimate equation (6) as a standard 
fixed-effects regression. 
 
   10
3.  Data Description and Sample Statistics 
  Our data are derived from a commercial database collected by Bureau van Dijck, a software 
and consulting company, marketed under the name of Amadeus.  The database consists of 
company accounts reported to national statistical offices for European companies for which at 
least one of the following criteria is satisfied:  total turnover or assets of at least $12 million, or 
total employment of at least 150.  The database is organized by country with records for firms 
within each country.  The company records include information on whether the company has an 
ownership stake in a foreign affiliate, and identify affiliates by name and a unique identification 
number.  It is therefore possible to determine if a firm operates as part of a multinational group 
and to link parent firms to foreign affiliates anywhere in Europe via the unique identifiers. 
  Financial and operational information is available for 1993 through 1998, and we retrieve all 
companies for which unconsolidated accounts were available separately for the parent and its 
affiliates.  Due to variation in national reporting requirements, all companies in some countries—
in particular Great Britain, Greece, and Finland—lack basic information (e.g., wage bills) that 
are essential for our analysis.  Otherwise, we include companies in the data set simply on the 
basis of data availability and the ability to link parents with foreign affiliates.  Companies in all 
industries are included. 
  The available ownership information refers to the year 1998, and we assume that the parent-
affiliate ownership structure for 1998 applies to the earlier years.  While we cannot follow 
ownership changes during the sample period, we do not believe that this is a serious problem.  
To the extent that we are potentially including a few affiliates who were not affiliated in earlier 
years, we are introducing measurement error that likely biases our results towards zero.   11
  Matching parent companies to foreign affiliates yields an unbalanced panel of 865 parents 
and 1,919 affiliates over six years.  Table 1 shows the country distribution of parents and 
affiliates in our panel, where each parent has an average of 2.2 affiliates.  The parents are 
concentrated in Western Europe with significant numbers in France, Germany, Italy, and 
Belgium.  Smaller numbers of parent firms locate in Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain.  Affiliates are found in these countries as well as the Eastern and Central 
European countries of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.  The 
pattern of location of parents and affiliates looks broadly consistent with multinational 
investment patterns that respond to labor costs.  For example, high-wage Germany has relatively 
few affiliates whereas low-wage Spain has a significant number of affiliates. 
  Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 2.  There are 5,758 affiliate-year 
observations, which represents the 1,919 affiliates appearing in the panel an average of about 
three times each.  The key variables in Table 2 are wages and profits.  Again, with the 
unconsolidated accounts in Amadeus we can calculate wages and profits separately for parents 
and affiliates.  Wages are constructed as the reported wage bill divided by total number of 
employees, which is standard for corporate data in the profit-sharing literature (e.g., Hildreth and 
Oswald, 1997).  The wage bill includes wage and salary payments to employees as well as 
mandated employer contributions to government social-insurance funds.  As discussed below, 
we also try log-level wages.  Profits are constructed in the standard way: value added (i.e., sales 
minus materials costs) minus the wage bill, all divided by total employment (e.g., Blanchflower 
et al., 1996).  We constructed the capital-to-labor ratio as reported capital stock divided by 
employment, and constructed R&D intensity as reported R&D expenditures divided by   12
employment.  All monetary measures are reported in Amadeus in home currencies; we converted 
these to U.S. dollars using International Monetary Fund annual exchange rates. 
  The average wage for affiliates is $46,367 and for parents is $55,868.  Unfortunately, 
Amadeus reports no skill indicators (e.g., occupation or educational attainment).  But this 
average-wage difference accords with standard trade models of multinational firms in which 
parents concentrate on skill-intensive production of firm-wide knowledge assets (e.g., Carr, 
Markusen, and Maskus, 2001).  Per-employee profits are higher, on average, in the affiliates than 
in their parents.  Note that wages exhibit significantly less variability than profits.  The standard 
deviations for wages are only 30 to 40 percent of the mean, whereas the standard deviations for 
profits are 2.8 to 4.4 times greater than the mean.  Moreover, both wages and profits are more 
variable in the affiliates than in their parents.  The correlation between parent and affiliate wages 
is 0.25 while the correlation between parent and affiliate profits is 0.05.  The higher wage 
correlation than profit correlation is suggestive of cross-border rent sharing. 
  Over 90 percent of the observations involve affiliates that are majority-owned by the parents, 
and 32 percent are fully-owned.12  The last four rows of Table 2 reveal that the parents are, 
unsurprisingly, much larger than their affiliates both in terms of sales and employment.  Also, 
recall that the Amadeus data are limited to medium and large firms, so the average affiliate 
employment is 382. 
4.  Estimation Results for Fixed-Effects and GMM Estimates 
  Table 3 reports our initial fixed-effects estimates of equation (6), where in this table Zat 
includes a full set of affiliate and year fixed effects, αa and ηt.  As discussed earlier, these control 
                                                 
12 There are a large number of missing values for the ownership shares in Amadeus.  For U.S.-headquartered multinationals in 
recent years, approximately 80 percent of affiliates are majority-owned, so in our data we assume that an affiliate is majority-
owned if its ownership share is missing.  The results are robust to excluding these observations from the majority-owned   13
for many time-constant determinants of wages (e.g., worker quality) and for time effects (e.g., 
technological change), respectively.  In all estimation tables, each column reports for each 
regressor a coefficient estimate and its robust standard error that accounts for cases where 
multiple affiliates share the same parent.  For the profits regressors, we also report the implied 
wage-profits elasticity. 
  Column 1 reports results for the full sample.  The standard closed-economy rent-sharing 
result is evident:  affiliate profits are positively correlated with affiliate wages, significantly so 
with a very low p-value.  The implied elasticity is 0.0087.  The coefficient on parent profits is 
positive, but is imprecisely estimated and so offers little support for international rent sharing. 
  The specification in column 1, however, pools both minority and majority-owned affiliates.  
It seems reasonable to expect international rent sharing to be stronger for majority and fully-
owned affiliates.  In our Section 2 discussion of within-firm cross-border risk sharing, parents 
with only a minority ownership stake may play a negligible role in the multinational firm being 
considered.  Alternatively, it may be that only the majority-owning parent engages in bargaining 
with affiliate workers.  In this case the profitability of minority-owning parents may be 
irrelevant.  Or in situations of fairness, in firms with multiple minority owners the identity of 
these minority parents may simply be unknown to affiliate workers during wage discussions.  
For all these reasons, it seems plausible to expect any profit sharing from parents to affiliates to 
be stronger the higher is the ownership stake in the affiliate. 
  Column 2 reports fixed-effects results of restricting the sample to only majority-owned 
affiliates (which includes those fully owned).  The affiliate-profit coefficient is virtually 
unchanged, but there is now strong statistical support for international rent sharing within 
                                                                                                                                                             
analysis.  We define fully-owned affiliates as those owned at least 99 percent owned by the parent; this definition does not 
include affiliates with missing ownership-share information.   14
multinational firms.  The parent-profit coefficient is 0.0033, with a t-statistic of 2.71 and a p-
value of 0.007.  The implied elasticity is 0.0073. 
  Evidence of both standard within-country rent sharing and international rent sharing is even 
stronger in column 3, in which the sample is further restricted to only fully-owned affiliates.  
Despite a 65 percent reduction in the sample size relative to column 1, both the affiliate and 
parent profits estimates are now larger and more precisely estimated.  The elasticities in columns 
2 and 3 are also within the range generally found in the literature on domestic rent-sharing, 
between 0.006 (Christofides and Oswald, 1992) to about 0.05 (Blanchflower et al., 1996). 
  Table 3 shows evidence that parent profits are shared across borders with majority-owned 
affiliates, and that this profit sharing may be even stronger among fully-owned affiliates.  Two 
concerns about these results, however, may be the lack of additional controls and any 
endogeneity or measurement issues stemming from the use of contemporaneous profits.  These 
two important issues are addressed in Tables 4 and 5. 
  Table 4 reports results of repeating the analyses of Table 3 adding to equation (6) the 
following Zat controls in addition to affiliate and time effects:  affiliate capital intensity, affiliate 
R&D intensity, and a full set of country-year effects.  The qualitative pattern of profit sharing is 
the same, although the statistical significance of the international rent sharing effect becomes 
more marginal. 
  Of greater concern than the specific set of controls may be issues of endogeneity and 
measurement related to the use of contemporaneous profits.  These econometric issues may be 
more severe in the domestic rent-sharing literature, but it is nevertheless important to address   15
them here.13  As discussed in Section 2, to account for endogeneity and measurement error, we 
use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that instruments for current-period 
profits using lagged values of profits, all on time-differenced data to capture affiliate effects αa. 
  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report GMM results estimating equation (7) on for majority-
owned and fully-owned affiliates, respectively.  These GMM estimates provide strong support 
for our international rent-sharing hypothesis.  In both columns, parent rent sharing is evident and 
statistically significant at the five-percent level.  The implied elasticities are also larger than in 
the previous fixed-effects estimates, with the fully-owned elasticity slightly larger than the 
majority-owned elasticity.  The Sargan test of overidentification indicates that the instruments 
are valid, while the serial-correlation test fails to reject the hypothesis of no second order serial 
correlation.  These tests indicate that GMM estimation is appropriate. 
  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 add to equation (7) our additional Zat regressors of affiliate 
capital intensity, affiliate R&D intensity, and country-year effects.  Because this specification 
includes the largest set of controls and also instruments for profits, it is our preferred 
specification.  The international rent sharing result is again evident at standard significance 
levels.  The elasticities indicate that a ten-percent increase in parent profitability increases 
affiliate wages by 0.5 percent. 
  The results in Tables 3 through 5 use as the dependent variable wages in levels.  But much of 
the domestic rent-sharing literature uses log wages.  We use wage levels because the theoretical 
motivation in Section 2 does not necessarily imply that log wages are related to profits, and also 
because the wage distribution in our data appears more normal than log-normal (unlike the 
distribution of wages across people in individual-level data sets).  Nevertheless, given the 
                                                 
13 An important measurement difference between the domestic rent-sharing literature and our estimation is that although the 
same quantities are used to construct affiliate wages and affiliate profits, the same is not true for affiliate wages and parent   16
prevalence of log-wage analyses in the previous literature, Appendix Table 1 reports fixed-
effects and GMM estimates in which the dependent variable is the log wage.  The pattern of 
results are unchanged, with statistically significant estimates (marginally so in column 1) and 
with implied elasticities in the same range as in Tables 3 through 5.  Because of the distribution 
of wages in our data, we prefer our wage-levels specifications but note that results are consistent 
in log-wage specifications. 
  We checked the robustness of our findings to a number of other measurement and 
specification issues (these results not reported, for brevity).  One was how we measured profits.  
As discussed earlier, our profit measure follows that of several other studies, and corresponds to 
the economic concept of rents available for sharing with workers. In the underlying Amadeus 
data, firms in some countries report accounting measures of gross profits.  These may vary 
across countries with differences in national accounting standards or with any transfer-pricing 
considerations for firms.  The sample correlation between our profit measure and this accounting 
measure was over 0.9; accordingly, our results were robust to alternative profit measures. 
  A second check we tried was to use lagged rather than contemporaneous profit measures in 
our fixed-effects estimates.  Many rent-sharing studies use lagged profit measures to control at 
least partially for endogeneity concerns.  We prefer our GMM estimation to address endogeneity, 
but we still tried fixed-effects estimates using profit measures lagged one year.  We obtained 
results qualitatively identical to those reported here. 
  A third check was to interact profit measures with geographic distance between the parent 
and affiliate countries, and also with a dummy variable indicating adjacency of parent and 
affiliate countries. It might be the case that the extent to which multinationals share profits 
                                                                                                                                                             
profits.  There is less reason to expect spurious correlation between affiliate wages and parent profits.   17
internally depends on information flows, for which physical location might be a proxy.  We 
found no substantial variation in profit sharing from distance and/or adjacency. 
  Having established parent-to-affiliate rent sharing, we next reverse focus to look for evidence 
of affiliate-to-parent rent sharing.  As discussed in Section 2, in principle the international 
aspects of wage setting could be symmetrical.  Just as affiliate workers might risk-share over 
parent profitability, so, too, might parent workers risk-share over affiliate profitability. 
  To look for covariation in parent wages and affiliate profits, we reconfigure our panel from 
affiliate-year observations to parent-year observations.  In this reconfigured panel, each parent in 
each year can have any number of foreign affiliates.  One way to treat this multi-affiliate aspect 
of our data would be to treat each parent-affiliate-year combination as a separate observation.  
An alternative would be to average the profitability of all affiliates for each parent-year 
observation.  We tried both methods and obtained qualitatively similar results either way.  For 
brevity, we report results for just the latter approach, where profits per worker across all affiliates 
are averaged using affiliate sales as weights.  Given the suggestive evidence in earlier tables that 
parents share profits more strongly with affiliates the larger the ownership stake, we also tried 
averaging affiliate profitability using only majority-owned and then only fully owned affiliates. 
  Table 6 reports some baseline fixed-effects estimates of equation (6) for parent wages on 
both parent and affiliate profits per worker.  As indicated, each column uses a different set of 
affiliates for each parent-year observation for constructing affiliate profitability.  The standard 
domestic rent-sharing result is evident in the significantly positive correlation between parent 
profitability and parent wages, with the implied wage-profits elasticity of about 0.01 or 0.02.  
However, Table 6 shows no evidence of international rent sharing:  the coefficient estimates on 
affiliate profitability are all close to zero with low t-statistics.  We obtained very similar results   18
for specifications (not reported for brevity) that added additional regressors, as in Table 4, or that 
treated all parent-affiliate-year observations separately, as described above. 
  Issues of endogeneity may be obscuring some link between affiliate profits and parent wages.  
To test this we re-estimated the specifications of Table 6 using GMM estimation techniques as in 
equation (7).  As with our earlier GMM estimates, we instrument for parent and affiliate profits 
using their lagged values and other regressors.  Table 7 reports these GMM estimates for 
calculations of affiliate profits using all affiliates and just majority-owned affiliates (similar 
calculations using just fully owned affiliates yielded less-reliable GMM estimates due to the 
reduced number of observations, and thus are not reported).  The diagnostics of the Sargan and 
serial-correlation tests indicate these GMM equations are well specified.  But as in Table 6, here 
there is no significant correlation between parent wages and affiliate profitability. 
  Based on the results in Tables 6 and 7, we find no evidence that affiliate profits are shared 
with parent workers.  This lack of profit sharing from affiliates to parent workers may reflect a 
number of issues.  For example, if affiliates are quite small relative to parents, and/or are 
minority owned and thus perhaps not known, then wage setting in parents may simply ignore 
affiliate activity.  We consider this to be an area for future research. 
5. Conclusions 
  The large literature on profit sharing is almost exclusively focused within single countries.  
Against a backdrop of increased globalization, in this paper we extend Budd and Slaughter’s 
(2000) international rent sharing idea to multinational firms.  Budd and Slaughter’s (2000)   
relatively limited data can examine only international rent sharing between the United States and 
Canada in unionized manufacturing firms using industry-level profits.  In the present paper, we   19
construct and examine a unique firm-level panel to examine whether profits are shared across 
borders within multinational firms for a much wider array of industries and countries. 
  Our central finding is a positive, statistically significant relationship between parent profits 
per worker and foreign wages in majority and fully-owned affiliates.  This relationship is robust 
to a number of specification and estimation choices, including using GMM estimation to address 
possible endogeneity and measurement issues.  Our estimates of the profit elasticity of wages 
vary between about 0.01 and 0.05, which falls in the range estimated by the domestic profit 
sharing literature.  If we take our average elasticity to be 0.03, then Lester’s (1952) range of 
wages calculation implies that the cross-section variability of parent profits explains about one-
fifth of the cross-section variability in affiliate wages.14 
  Our results are an important addition to the literature on rent sharing.  But equally 
importantly, our results document important effects of globalization on local economic 
outcomes.  This carries important implications for both policy and theory, and underscores the 
increasingly global nature of labor markets.  For example, international rent sharing can help 
explain why multinational affiliates tend to pay higher wages than do purely domestic firms. 
  Finally, we believe our findings are relevant for the international macro literature on real 
business cycles and correlated international movements in macro aggregates.  This literature has 
focused on the transmission of national income shocks through explicit risk sharing in 
international capital markets.  Our findings suggest an additional linkage – international profit 
sharing between parents and affiliates in multinational firms – that can transmit economic 
conditions across national borders.  In the labor literature, one standard explanation for rent 
                                                 
14 For Lester’s (1952) range-of-wages calculation, we follow Blanchflower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997).  
Assuming a distribution of profits that is four standard deviations wide, then the range of parent profits is roughly 1200 (four 
times 307.223 from Table 2), or, relative to the mean of 108.203, a factor of 12 times the mean.  Multiplying 12 times the 
elasticity of 0.03 yields a range of 36 percent of the mean wage stemming from international rent sharing.  The mean and   20
sharing in a domestic context is implicit risk sharing between firms and workers.  Our findings 
suggest that risk sharing across countries can also occur implicitly through multinational firms. 
  In our data, the average within-firm standard deviation of parent profits is 34.5.  Within-firm 
profits therefore vary year to year by an average of 30 percent.  Our central wage-parent profits 
elasticity of 0.03 then implies that average year-to-year variation in parent profits causes affiliate 
wages to vary by nearly one percent each year.  Considering that average annual wage growth is 
often less than five percent, a one-percent change that stems solely from variability in parent 
profitability in a foreign country is striking.  This back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 
international rent sharing is sufficiently strong for its implications to extend beyond 
understanding individual wage outcomes.  Future work in labor economics, international 
economics, and macroeconomics might benefit from incorporating this phenomenon to further 
our understanding of economic behavior and outcomes in a global economy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
standard deviation of affiliate wages implies that the range of wages is approximately 1.6 times the mean, which implies that 
profit variability can explain (0.36/1.6), or about 20 percent, of the variability in wages.   21
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Table 1 





Austria 60  16 
Belgium 208  148 
Bulgaria 5  0 
Czech Republic  4  0 
France 592  271 
Germany 64  215 
Hungary 17  0 
Italy 284  155 
Luxembourg 24  3 
Netherlands 21  5 
Poland 33  0 
Portugal 64  2 
Romania 33  0 
Spain 510  50 
    
Total 1,919  865 
Notes:  Sample of European multinational parents and affiliates, 1993 through 1998, 
taken from Amadeus Database.  See text for details. 
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Table 2 









Average Wage, Affiliates 
[= wage bill ÷ employment] 
46.367 18.439 
Average Wage, Parents 
[= wage bill ÷ employment] 
55.868 16.710 
Profits per Employee, Affiliates 
[= (sales – materials cost - wage bill) ÷ 
employment] 
126.471 553.324 
Profits per Employee, Parents 
[= (sales – materials cost - wage bill) ÷ 
employment] 
108.203 307.223 
Indicator of Majority-Owned Affiliate  0.919  0.272 
Indicator of Fully-Owned Affiliate  0.322  0.467 
Capital-Labor Ratio, Affiliates 
[= capital stock bill ÷ employment] 
64.113 450.507 
R&D Intensity, Affiliates 
[= R&D expenditures ÷ employment] 
8.067 50.622 
Sales, Affiliates  110,826.2  432,223.5 
Sales, Parents  1,376,961  3,379,460 
Employment, Affiliates  382.868  1701.407 
Employment, Parents  4,411.355  8,323.11 
Notes:  Summary statistics are calculated for the sample of 5758 affiliates used in the 
first regression of Table 3.  These cover all affiliates with sufficient data for the full 
six years of the sample, 1993 through 1998.  All monetary variables are denominated 
in thousands of U.S. dollars.  Employment is number of bodies.  The two indicator 
variables are categorical variables coded 1 if the ownership criterion is met and 0 
otherwise.  See text for details.   26
 
Table 3 




















Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0087]  [0.0085]  [0.0310] 
     






Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0027]  [0.0073]  [0.0124] 
     
Year  Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
No.  Observations  5758 5296 1852 
No. Affiliates  1919  1760  582 
R-Squared  Within  0.15 0.15 0.20 
R-Squared  Between  0.01 0.01 0.05 
Notes:  These are estimation results for equation (6) in the text.  Dependent variable is affiliate average wage.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates.   27
 
Table 4 




















Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0083]  [0.0082]  [0.0291] 
     






Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0007]  [0.0048]  [0.0066] 
     






     






     
Year-Country  Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
No.  Observations  5243 4828 1774 
No. Affiliates  1703  1561  545 
R-Squared  Within  0.19 0.18 0.26 
R-Squared  Between  0.02 0.02 0.03 
Notes:  These are estimation results for equation (6) in the text.  Dependent variable is affiliate average wage.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates.   28
 
Table 5 

























Implied  Wage-Profit  Elasticity  [0.0404] [0.0464] [0.0382] [0.0565] 
      








Implied  Wage-Profit  Elasticity  [0.0352] [0.0407] [0.0498] [0.0497] 
      






      




      
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Year-Country Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
No.  Observations  2971 1134 2971 1134 
No.  Affiliates  1007 379 1007 379 
Sargan Test Statistic (dof = 10)  12.44  18.42  12.99  16.72 
Serial-Correlation  Test  Statistic  -1.156 -1.668 -1.395 -1.378 
Notes:  These are estimation results for equation (7) in the text.  Dependent variable is affiliate average wage.  Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates.   29
 
Table 6 




















Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0006]  [0.0006]  [-0.0041] 
     






Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0189]  [0.0206]  [0.0083] 
     
Year  Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
No.  Observations  2618 2340 1233 
No.  Parents  825 736 389 
R-Squared  Within  0.17 0.17 0.17 
R-Squared  Between  0.02 0.02 0.01 
Notes:  These are estimation results for equation (6) in the text.  Dependent variable is parent average wage.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. 
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Table 7 















Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [-0.0006]  [-0.0010] 
    




Implied Wage-Profit Elasticity  [0.0168]  [0.0214] 
    
Year Effects  Yes  Yes 
No. Observations  1822  1641 
No. Parents  593  534 
Sargan Test Statistic (dof = 10/7)  8.30  6.24 
Serial-Correlation Test Statistic  -1.171  -0.969 
Notes:  These are estimation results for equation (7) in the text.  Dependent variable is 
parent average wage.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient 
estimates.   31
 
Appendix Table 1 
Profit Sharing With Affiliate Wages in Logs 
























Implied  Wage-Profit  Elasticity  [0.0095] [0.0347] [0.0511] [0.0414] 
      








Implied  Wage-Profit  Elasticity  [0.0060] [0.0103] [0.0373] [0.0360] 
      
Year  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  Observations  5296 1852 2971 1134 
No.  Affiliates  1760 582 1007 379 
R-Squared Within  0.07  0.16     
R-Squared Between  0.01  0.03     
Sargan Test Statistic (dof = 10)      11.70  16.88 
Serial-Correlation Test Statistic      0.791  -1.204 
Notes:  These are estimation results for equations (6) and (7) in the text.  Dependent variable is log affiliate average wage.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. 